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WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
CORRECTING A CONFUSING MESS
KENNETH M. MURCHISON*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1970, Congress has directed agencies of the United States
government to comply with the requirements of a variety of state envi-
ronmental statutes. Not surprisingly, the directives have spawned con-
troversies as regulators and environmental activists have tried to force
federal agencies to comply with statutory mandates. Although federal
agencies have prevailed twice in Supreme Court litigation regarding the
scope of the directives in major environmental statutes,1 Congress partially
abrogated both of those judicial victories in subsequent legislation. The
most recent legislative change occurred in 1992 when Congress amended
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 2 to subject federal agencies
to civil penalties for past violations.3 The 1992 legislative revision has
not, however, eliminated the confusion over the environmental waivers.
Federal agencies have continued to contest their obligations to pay civil
penalties under the Clean Air Act 4 and to reduce their contributions to
water pollution from nonpoint sources.5
* Professor Murchison (B.A., 1969, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; J.D., 1972, University
of Virginia; M.A., 1975, University of Virginia; S.J.D., 1988, Harvard Law School) is
James E. & Betty M. Phillips Professor at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana
State University.
1 U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act and Clean Water Act); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (Clean Water Act); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (Clean
Air Act).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000).
3 Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505, 1506
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2000)).
4 See Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1357 (11th Cir. 2005); City of
Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003); Cal. ex rel.
Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir.
1999).
'See Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998).
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This Article describes and critiques the interaction of legislation
and judicial decisions summarized in the preceding paragraph. It begins
with a review of the doctrines regarding federal immunity. Next, it dis-
cusses the waivers that have appeared in federal environmental statutes
since 1970 and the litigation those waivers have produced. After describ-
ing the confusing state of the current law regarding environmental waivers,
the Article offers proposals for legislative and judicial responses to reduce
the confusion.
I. FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM STATE REGULATION: A FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that federal agencies
are immune from state taxes and regulations that impede the accom-
plishment of the functions entrusted to the agencies.6 The seminal case
6 Since the 1970s, Congress has also required agencies in the executive branch to comply
with the requirements of federal environmental statutes. Even though federal agencies
have no immunity from federal law comparable to the immunity they enjoy from state
regulations, these congressional mandates to comply with federal environmental law have
produced two types of disputes.
First, federal agencies have claimed exemption from some of the normal mech-
anisms for enforcing environmental regulations. Although some litigation between federal
litigants has occurred, such lawsuits are rare because the Department of Justice normally
represents federal litigants. See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can
the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 895-97 (1991) (citing
cases). In the environmental arena, the Department of Justice has generally declined to
file suit on behalf of the EPA against other federal agencies. See Maine v. U.S. Dep't of
the Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322,338 n.8 (D. Me. 1988), vacated, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992);
Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Agencies?, 17 ECO. L. Q. 317, 325 (1990).
Additionally, the President has given the Office of Management and Budget the power
to resolve disputes between the EPA and other agencies concerning enforcement of fed-
eral environmental laws. Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707, 47,708-09 (Oct. 13,
1978), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2928 (Jan. 23, 1987),
and Exec. Order No. 13,148, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,595 (Apr. 21, 2000), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (2000); see also Exec. Order No. 12,146, §§ 1-401 to -402, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657,
42,658 (July 18, 1979), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,608, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,617 (Sept.
9, 1987), and Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619 (Feb. 28, 2003), reprinted in
28 U.S.C. § 509 (2000) (resolution of interagency legal disputes by the Attorney General).
Second, federal agencies have claimed immunity from enforcement actions filed
by private parties. Environmental statutes frequently allow private parties to enforce
their provisions. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (2000). By including the United States among
the potential defendants, such "citizen suits" waive the federal government's sovereign
immunity from being sued. Unlike waiver of federal immunity to state regulation, waiver
of the federal government's sovereign immunity from being sued involves no fundamental
constitutional principle. Nonetheless, the Court has consistently applied a rule of strict
[Vol. 32:359360
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is McCulloch v. Maryland,' where the Court ruled that the Bank of the
United States did not have to pay taxes imposed by the state.
In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall grounded federal immunity
doctrine in the Supremacy Clause.' Implicit in the supremacy of federal
law was, he argued, freedom from state power that could destroy the instru-
mentalities Congress had established to carry out its functions. Because
"the power to tax involves the power to destroy," he concluded that
Maryland could not tax the Bank of the United States.9
Subsequent decisions have adhered to, and extended, the McCulloch
principle. They have reaffirmed the immunity doctrine in cases involving
state taxes ° and have also applied it to state regulations.' 1 The Supreme
construction to these waivers as well. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,
538-42 (1980); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983); Block v. N.D. ex
rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983); United States v. King, 395 U.S.
1, 4-5 (1969); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,590 (1941); John H. Kongable, Civil
Penalties Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Must Federal Facilities
Pay?, 30 A.F. L. REV. 21, 22-24 (1989).
Attempts to grant one federal agency administrative enforcement authority over
other agencies can raise constitutional concerns as well as problems of statutory con-
struction. The "unitary executive" theory, see Steinberg, supra, at 325-31; criticized in
Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative OverAgencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The
Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 627, 628-34 (1989), interprets the President's power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, as a constitutional grant of authority to
resolve conflicts within the executive branch of government. Relying on this theory, the
Department of Justice initially opposed congressional attempts to expand the EPA's
authority to enforce environmental regulations against other federal agencies. See, e.g.,
Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 182-206 (1987)
(statement of F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant Att'y Gen., Land and Natural Resources
Division).
Since 2000, federal agencies have continued to resist both state and federal
sanctions for violations of the Clean Air Act. See infra notes 154-86 and accompanying
text. In a recent federal case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the administrative compliance
order issued against the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") was not a final agency
action, although the court declared that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional to the
extent that it tried to make administrative compliance orders binding without providing
any opportunity for a hearing and judicial review. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336
F.3d 1236, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004).
7 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
8 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9 McCulloch, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.) at 431.
'
0 See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982); United States v. Boyd, 378
U.S. 39 (1964); Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953); James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
"' See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Paul v. United
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Court has, however, recognized at least two limits to the doctrine. First,
federal immunity is normally available only when the state tax or regu-
lation is imposed directly on the federal government. 12 Second, agencies
must comply with state regulations that do not significantly impede the
agency's ability to perform its duties.
13
Inasmuch as federal immunity from state taxes and regulations
protects congressional power rather than the rights of individuals, the
Supreme Court has allowed Congress to waive the immunity. The Court
has, however, qualified this waiver authority by adopting a rule of strict
construction.14 Because federal immunity is a fundamental principle of
federalism, waiver of the immunity requires a clear statement of con-
gressional intent. Courts are not to extend waivers beyond the express
language that Congress chooses, a principle of statutory construction
that the Supreme Court has reemphasized in recent cases.' 5
II. WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES:
A CONTINUING CONTROVERSY
Congress has exercised its waiver authority in a variety of statutes. 6
In federal environmental statutes, waivers of federal immunity to state
regulations have been commonplace, and the waivers in pollution control
laws have become increasingly broad and inclusive.'7 Congress has never
States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943); Arizona v.
California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).2 See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982); United States v. State Tax
Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975); United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964); Esso Standard
Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937);
United States v. Hawkins County, 859 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005
(1989). The Court has also applied the immunity when state taxes discriminated against
private parties because of their relationship with the federal government. See, e.g., Davis
v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920); Virginia v. Stiff, 144 F. Supp. 169
(W.D. Va. 1956); Exparte Willman, 277 F. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
14 E.g., Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,
347 U.S. 110, 122 (1954); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-48 (1943).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993). This rule of strict construction also
extends to waivers of immunity from the requirements of federal law. See Lane v. Pena,
518 U.S. 187 (1996); see also supra note 6. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Waiving
Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771 (1995).
16 For examples outside the environmental context, see, e.g., 4 U.S.C. §§ 104, 106 (2000)
(taxes on federal installations); 12 U.S.C. § 1714 (2000) (taxes on certain properties
acquired by the Department of Housing and Urban Development); 42 U.S.C. § 659 (2000)
(enforcement of support obligations of individuals serving in the United States military).
'7 See Kenneth M. Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement: Lessons From
[Vol. 32:359362
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enacted a general provision waiving immunity to state environmental
regulations," but it has included a waiver in most environmental statutes
passed since 1970. Moreover, the waivers in more recent statutes are
considerably broader than those enacted in the first half of the 1970s. 19
The waivers to state environmental regulations have produced
frequent litigation over their scope. In resolving these controversies, the
Supreme Court has twice applied the rule of strict construction and read
the waivers narrowly. 20 Following each of the Supreme Court decisions,
Congress reversed the Court's specific holdings in subsequent amend-
ments to the statutes that produced the litigation. Congress has, however,
never made its broadest waiver language uniformly applicable to all
environmental statutes, and litigation has continued in the lower federal
courts in the fifteen years since the most recent Supreme Court decision.
A. 1970s: The Duty to Comply With Federal and State Requirements
During the 1970s, Congress substituted a duty to comply with
federal, state, and local environmental laws for the previous policy of
cooperation insofar as practicable and consistent with other federal
policies and available appropriations.' A qualified duty to comply
"consistent with the paramount interest of the United States as
determined by the President" originated with the Water Quality and
Environmental Improvement Act of 1970.22 In the same year, the Clean
Twenty Years of Waiving Federal Immunity to State Regulations, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 179,
185-91 (1992).
18 But see id. at 207-08 (arguing that such a provision would be desirable).
19Id. at 185-88.
21 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-365, § 2, 73 Stat. 646 (Air Pollution); Water
Pollution Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-660, § 9, 70 Stat. 498, 506 (Water
Pollution). See generally Murchison, supra note 17, at 181-82; Kenneth M. Murchison, Waivers
of Intergovernmental Immunity in Federal Environmental Statutes, 62 VA. L. REV. 1177,1182-
85 (1976) [hereinafter Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity].
22 Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. The statute requires that all agencies
having jurisdiction over any real property or facility, or engaged in any
Federal public works activity of any kind, shall, consistent with the
paramount interest of the United States as determined by the President,
insure compliance with applicable water quality standards and the
purposes of this Act in the administration of such property, facility, or
activity.
Id. § 103, 84 Stat. at 107-08. Even before the passage of this legislation, the President
had issued an Executive Order that required federal agencies to comply with air and
water quality "standards and related plans of implementation." Exec. Order No. 11,507,
35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (Feb. 5, 1970). See generally Murchison, Waivers ofIntergovernmental
36320081
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Air Act Amendments of 1970 extended the compliance duty without
qualification.
Section 118 of the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, man-
dated that federal agencies "comply with Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution."23
Although the waiver in the air law was unqualified, it did allow the
President to exempt federal agencies from its provisions when required
by the "paramount interest" of the United States.24
The Clean Air Act Amendments also added a new method for
enforcing its provisions. The citizen suit provision authorized any person
to bring a civil action against any person (including the United States)
alleged to be in violation of the emissions standards of the Clean Air Act
or an order issued by the EPA Administrator or a state. It specifically
granted the federal district courts jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief
or to apply appropriate civil penalties.25 In addition, the general statutory
definition of the term "person" specifically included "the United States,
and.., any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution."26
Other federal environmental statutes enacted in the first half of
the 1970s included waivers generally modeled on the one found in the
Clean Air Act. Specifically, Congress included waiver provisions in the
Clean Water Act, the Noise Control Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act.
When section 313 was added to the Clean Water Act 27 in 1972, it
instructed federal agencies to comply with "Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements respecting control and abatement of pollution."28 The
waiver in the water law went beyond the Clean Air Act in one respect by
also requiring federal agencies to pay any "reasonable service charges"
associated with water pollution control.29
Immunity, supra note 21, at 1182.
23 Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 5, 84 Stat. 1676, 1689.
24 Id.
25 Id. § 12(a), 84 Stat. at 1706.
26 id.
27 The official name of the statute is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, but Congress
noted in the 1977 Amendments that it was "commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act."
See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566. This article con-
sistently uses the Clean Water Act designation to avoid confusion.
28 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86
Stat. 816, 875.
29 Id.
364 [Vol. 32:359
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Like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act included a citizen
suit provision.3 ° It allowed any "citizen" to bring an enforcement action
"against any person (including.. .the United States)... alleged to be in
violation of.. .an effluent standard or... an order issued by the [EPA]
Administrator or a State."31 The Clean Water Act provision authorized
"appropriate civil penalties" under the enforcement section of the Act,32 and
the enforcement section authorized civil penalties against "any person"
violating the requirements of the Act.33 However, the Clean Water Act defi-
nition of "person"-unlike the Clean Air Act definition-did not include
the United States.34
The Noise Control Act of 1972 contained a substantive waiver
virtually identical to the one originally found in section 118 of the Clean
Air Act.35 However, its citizen suit provision only allowed injunctive re-
lief,3s and the enforcement provisions excluded the United States from
the definition of "person."3 7
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 also included a substantive
waiver modeled on the air and water statutes, except that it expanded the
waiver to include permits, reports, and other procedural requirements, 8
probably in response to the litigation then underway in the lower federal
courts.39 Like the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act expressly
made the United States liable for reasonable service fees. However, unlike
3 0 Id. § 2, 86 Stat. at 888-89 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000)).
31 1d. § 2, 86 Stat. at 888 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (2000)). The provision defines
citizen as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected."
Id. § 2, 86 Stat. at 889. Congress settled on this language after the Supreme Court
broadly construed similar language in the Administrative Procedure Act. See Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1972).32 See Clean Water Act § 2, 86 Stat. at 888 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(2000)).33 Id. § 2, 86 Stat. at 860 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), (d) (2000)).34 Id. § 2, 86 Stat. at 886 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (2000)).
" Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 4, 86 Stat. 1234, 1235 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 4903(b) (2000)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 5, 84
Stat. 1676, 1689-90 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (2000)).
36 Noise Control Act § 12, 86 Stat. at 1243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4911(a) (2000)).
37 Id. § 11(e), 86 Stat. at 1243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4910(e) (2000)). The exclusion in
section 11(e) is an exception to the general inclusion of federal agencies within the stat-
utory definition of"person."Id. § 3, 86 Stat. at 1234 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4902(2) (2000)).38 Pub. L. No. 93-523, § 1447, 88 Stat. 1660, 1688-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300j-6(a) (2000)).
3 For a summary ofthat litigation, see Murchison, Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity,
supra note 21, at 1190-97.
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the air and water statutes, it limited the President's ability to waive com-
pliance to matters in the "paramount interest of the United States." 40 Like
the air statute, the drinking water law defined "person" to include federal
agencies," but its citizen suit provision did not specifically authorize the
imposition of civil penalties."2
The initial litigation over environmental waivers concerned
whether the waivers in the air and water statutes required the federal
government to obtain permits and to comply with other "procedural" pro-
visions found in state environmental laws."3 The courts of appeals split
over the issue, and so the question reached the Supreme Court in 1976.
Relying on the rule of strict construction, the Supreme Court interpreted
both statutes to limit the federal government's compliance obligations to
the substantive standards established by state law.""
Less than five months after the Supreme Court decisions, Congress
enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.45 The waiver lan-
guage of the new statute responded to the Supreme Court decision by clar-
ifying congressional intent with respect to the matters then being litigated
under the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.46
Like the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act waiver expressly covered "all" requirements whether designated sub-
stantive or procedural, and specifically included permits and reports
within the definition of requirements. It also added a provision subjecting
federal agencies and employees to sanctions imposed by courts to enforce
injunctions. v
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also included a
citizen suit provision allowing any person to file an enforcement against
any violator of the statute.4 Like the Clean Water Act, the Resource
40 42 U.S.C. § 300j(6)(a).
41 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1411, 88 Stat. at 1662 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300f(12) (2000)).42 Id. § 1449, 88 Stat. at 1690 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (2000)).
' For a summary of the litigation in the lower federal courts, see Murchison, Waivers of
Intergovernmental Immunity, supra note 21, at 1187-97.
4See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976)
(Clean Water Act); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976) (Clean Air Act). For detailed
descriptions and a critical evaluation of the Supreme Court decisions, see Murchison,
Waivers of Intergovernmental Immunity, supra note 21, at 1197-1209.
4' Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000)).
4Id. §6001, 90 Stat. at 2821 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (2000)).47 Id.
4Id. § 7002, 90 Stat. at 2825 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000)).
366 [Vol. 32:359
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Conservation and Recovery Act allowed imposition of civil penalties, but
the statutory definition of "person" omitted the United States and its
agencies from the definition.4 9
In 1977-the year following the Supreme Court decisions constru-
ing the waivers in the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act-Congress
passed a trio of environmental laws. Separate amendments to the air and
water statutes reversed the outcomes produced by the Supreme Court
decisions by expanding the existing waivers in both statutes. In addition,
Congress also expanded the waiver provision of the Safe Drinking
Water Act. °
The 1977 amendments to both the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act subjected the federal government to "all" requirements re-
specting the control of air and water pollution, including recordkeeping,
permit, and reporting provisions. Both statutes also subjected the federal
government to any state or local "administrative authority" and "to any
process and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts
or in any other manner."51
The new waivers for air and water pollution were not identical,
however, and all of the differences suggested a somewhat broader waiver
under the Clean Air Act. Most significantly, the 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Water Act still did not include agencies of the federal government
within the definition of "person," " and the water law lacked the new sen-
tence added to subsection (e) of the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision.
The additional sentence in the air law declared that nothing in the citizen
suit section or "any other law of the United States" is to be construed to
"restrict any State, local, or interstate authority from.. . obtaining any
judicial" or "administrative" sanction against the United States or any
of its agencies or instrumentalities.53
49 Id. § 1004(15), 90 Stat. at 2800 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (2000)).
50 Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1393, 1397
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300j(6)(a) (2000)).
"' Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 61(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1598 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 116(a),
91 Stat. 685,711 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2000)). For a more detailed
discussion of the amendments to the waivers, see Murchison, supra note 17, at 188-90.
For a general description of the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Water Act, see Kenneth
M. Murchison, Learning From More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Water Pollution
Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev. 527, 557-64
(2005).
52 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (2000), with 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (2000).
" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 303(c), 91 Stat. at 772 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7604(e) (2000)).
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The Clean Water Act also contained several unique features that
further limited the reach of the statute's waiver of federal immunity. The
revised waiver in the water law slightly expanded the President's exemp-
tion authority with respect to property of the armed forces, limited the
imposition of penalties to those "arising under Federal law or imposed
by a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court,"
and disavowed any intent to preclude removal of actions against the
United States to federal court.54
The revised waiver provision in the Safe Drinking Water Act
generally tracked the new language in the 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Water Act, but it also included some provisions that arguably
made its waiver broader than the one in the water law. For one thing, the
drinking water act continued to impose stricter limits on the President's
authority to grant exemptions from the waiver provision." For another,
the Safe Drinking Water Act provision-like the Clean Air Act amend-
ment- defined "person" to include agencies and instrumentalities of the
United States.56
B. 1980s: New Disputes
The 1977 amendments did not eliminate the controversy over
waivers of immunity in federal environmental statutes; they simply
shifted the focus of the disputes. New disputes arose in four areas: the
ability of the United States to litigate immunity issues in federal court,
the determination of what state laws imposed requirements to which the
statutes had waived immunity, the duty of federal agencies to pay ser-
vice fees and charges, and the imposition of sanctions against federal
agencies that violated pollution control regulations. Although the federal
government did not win every case, it prevailed in most of the reported
decisions.
The First Circuit recognized a broad authority for federal agencies
to challenge state enforcement actions in federal court. It ruled that the
statute granting federal courts jurisdiction in civil actions filed by the
Clean Water Act of 1977 § 61(a), 91 Stat. at 1598 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000)).
5 Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977 § 8(a), 91 Stat. at 1396-97, (codified prior to
amendments at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6 (1988)).56 Id. § 8(b), 91 Stat. at 1397 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300f(12) (2000)).
368 [Vol. 32:359
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United States57 allowed the federal government to challenge the state's
denial of a water pollution permit in federal district court.58
The principal issues in the "requirements" cases involved the
extent to which the federal government was subject to state standards
that had not been translated into specific numerical standards or to state
regulations that went beyond the scope of the federal statute in which
the waiver was found. Until the late 1980s, the courts uniformly applied
the rule of strict construction with respect to the waivers in the Clean
Water Act, the Noise Control Act, and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act.59 In the last two years of the decade, however, the Ninth
Circuit and one district court in Colorado adopted a less restrictive inter-
pretation of the waiver in the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act.
The Ninth Circuit held that the waiver was applicable to local regulations
regarding the collection of solid waste,6" and the district court held that
the waiver encompassed nonnumerical state standards that were vir-
tually identical to federal standards that had been adopted by the EPA.6
The waivers in most federal environmental statutes obligate the
federal government to pay some fees associated with state environmental
laws. Beginning with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, the waivers in most federal environmental statutes have man-
dated federal agencies to pay reasonable service charges. Even without
a special provision regarding federal payment of regulatory charges and
fees, the Comptroller General concluded that the waiver in the 1977
Amendments to the Clean Air Act required federal agencies to pay permit
fees 2 but not charges that are properly classified as taxes rather than fees.63
57 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced
by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act
of Congress.").51 United States v. Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832, 839-40 (1st Cir. 1983).
51 See United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 717
F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984); Mo. ex rel. Ashcroft v. U.S.
Dep't of the Army, 672 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1982); Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835
(1st Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); New York v. United States,
620 F. Supp. 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich.
1985); Florida Dep't of Envtl. Reg. v. Silvex Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Fla. 1985). For
descriptions of the holdings in these cases, see Murchison, supra note 17, at 192-94.
60 Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 1988).
, Colorado v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (D. Colo. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
62 Comptroller General Opinion No. B-193379, 58 U.S. Comp. Gen. 244, 247-48 (1979).
63 See Comptroller General Opinion No. B-207695, 1983 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 1006
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Relying on a Supreme Court decision in a case involving a federal
fee levied on states,64 federal agencies have occasionally challenged state
charges as impermissible taxes. The federal challenges have generally
been reserved for two types of fees: those that impact the federal govern-
ment more severely than they impact private parties or state or local
entities; and those that set aside a portion of the regulatory charge for
a contingency fund or some other nonregulatory purpose.65
Although some states have acquiesced in the federal position
regarding fees, others have argued that the waivers for service charges
apply more broadly. At least two district courts that faced the issue fa-
vored the states. Rather than embrace the fee-tax distinction, the courts
found that the fees were payable because they were part of the state
"requirements" to which Congress has waived immunity.6
The most intensely litigated waiver issue during the 1980s was the
question of what sanctions were available against federal agencies that
violated pollution control regulations.67 The primary controversy regarding
sanctions was whether federal agencies had to pay civil penalties, especially
those imposed under state law.6" Despite an early district court decision
finding the Clean Air Act waiver sufficient to cover civil penalties,69 most of
the reported decisions reached the opposite result with respect to the
waivers of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and
(June 13, 1983).
6' Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978); see Murchison, supra note 17, at
196.
65 See generally William D. Benton & Byron D. Baur, Applicability of Environmental
"Fees" and "Taxes" to Federal Facilities, 31 A.F. L. REV. 253 (1989).
66 United States v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732, 733 (C.D. Cal.
1990); Maine v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322, 323 (D. Me. 1988), vacated, 973
F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992). But cf N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. U.S. Dep't of Energy,
772 F. Supp. 91, 91 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that Congress did not make a blanket
waiver of immunity from state taxation in the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, or the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, but the Department of Energy failed to show
that the challenged fees were impermissible taxes). For a summary of the holdings in
South Coast Air Quality Management District and Department of the Navy cases, see
Murchison, supra note 17, at 196-97.
67 Because the Department of Justice would not allow the EPA to file suits against federal
agencies, the litigation principally occurred in cases brought by state agencies responsible
for pollution control. See supra note 6.
" The Ninth Circuit also rejected an attempt to impose criminal liability on the Veterans
Administration and its Administrator for alleged violations of state law governing the
disposal of hazardous waste. California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1984).
69 Ala. ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208, 1211-12 (M.D. Ala. 1986);
see also S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 748 F. Supp. at 732.
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Recovery Act.7 ' By 1990, however, the Sixth Circuit and one district court
had issued decisions holding that federal agencies were subject to civil
penalties imposed under those two statutes as well.71 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the lower courts.72
As the civil penalties cases were working their way to the Supreme
Court, Congress continued to include waivers in new environmental stat-
utes. The waivers in the air, water, and hazardous waste laws remained
unchanged in the 1980s,73 but Congress did pass several new environmen-
tal statutes. All but one of them included waivers of federal immunity.
When a program for regulating underground storage tanks was
added to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1984,74 Congress
added a special waiver provision for the new program. It generally fol-
lowed the waiver applicable to other portions of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, with one notable exception. The provision pertaining
to underground storage tanks omitted the language specifically including
"any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be im-
posed by a court to enforce such relief" within the "requirements" covered
by the waiver. At the same time, it-like the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act-still abrogated the immunity of federal agencies
and employees with respect to "any process or sanction of any State or
Federal court with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive
relief."75
70 Mitzelfelt v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874,881 (9th Cir. 1989) (construing the waiver provision of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); California v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 845 F.2d
222, 225-26 (9th Cir. 1988) (construing the waiver of the Clean Water Act); see
Murchison, supra note 17, at 199-200.
71 Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1990); Maine v. Dep't of the
Navy, 702 F. Supp. at 329; see Murchison, supra note 17, at 200-01.
72 See Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 500 U.S. 951 (1991).
" Congress also enacted and amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act during the 1980s. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). Because
that Act focuses on remediation rather than regulations, its waiver is excluded from the
discussion in the text. As amended in 1986, the remediation statute generally subjects
federal facilities to "[sitate laws concerning removal and remedial action, including state
laws regarding enforcement," for releases of hazardous substances. Id. § 9620(a)(4)
(emphasis added). The First Circuit ruled that the waiver does not waive the federal
government's sovereign immunity with respect to civil penalties. Maine v. U.S. Dep't of
the Navy, 973 F.2d 1007, 1007 (1st Cir. 1992).
" The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221,
3277 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991 et seq. (2000)).
5Compare id. § 601(a), 98 Stat. at 3286 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6991(f) (2000)),
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The Medical Waste Tracking Act of 19886 contained the broadest
waiver of the statutes enacted during the 1980s. It combined a waiver
similar to other regulatory statutes with an expanded definition of
"requirements." The new definition declared that the requirements
included, but were not limited to, "all administrative orders, civil,
criminal, and administrative penalties, and other sanctions, including
injunctive relief, fines, and imprisonment."
Two other statutes enacted during the 1980s took more cautious
approaches to the waiver issue. The Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act ,78 which was part of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, established a reporting system for releases
of hazardous substances. It lacked an express waiver provision, and its
definition of "person" did not include the United States or its agencies. 9
Finally, Congress also enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act"° in 1986. It waived federal immunity when the federal
government uses a non-federal facility for the disposal of low level radio-
active wastes.8'
C. 1990s: Partial Resolution of Some Disputed Issues
The 1990s produced both legislative and judicial attempts to
resolve some of the controversies that had emerged during the preceding
decade. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,2 Congress again ex-
panded the waiver in that statute. Two years later, the Supreme Court
held that the only civil penalties that could be imposed on federal agencies
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or the Clean Water
Act were penalties imposed by judges to force compliance with injunctions.'
A few months after the Supreme Court decision, Congress enacted the
with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 6001, 90
Stat. 2795, 2821 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2000)).76 Pub. L. No. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2950 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6992-6992k
(2000)).
"Id. § 2, 102 Stat. at 2955.
" Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000)).79 Id. §§ 327, 329, 100 Stat. at 1757-58 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 11049(7) (2000)).
80 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 Pub. L. No. 99-240, § 102,
99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 202lb-2021j (West 2006)).
" Id. § 102, 99 Stat. at 1845 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2021d(b)(1)(B) (2000)).
82 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7601
(2000)).
' Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. 607, 628 (1992).
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Federal Facility Compliance Act; it reversed the Supreme Court decision
with respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.84
Various circuit courts also addressed several issues not directly
covered by the Supreme Court decision. Early in the decade, the Third
Circuit gave federal agencies even broader authority to challenge state
enforcement decisions in federal court.8" Near the end of the decade, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that federal agencies had to comply with state re-
strictions governing water pollution from nonpoint sources," and the
Sixth Circuit held that federal agencies were subject to civil penalties for
past violations of the Clean Air Act."
The Third Circuit decision expanding the ability of federal agencies
to challenge state enforcement actions in federal court came early in the
decade. The court of appeals broadly construed the Declaratory Judgment
Act 8 to permit a federal agency to file a declaratory judgment action
challenging its duty to comply with a state administrative order.8 9 The
decision gave federal agencies a venue normally denied to private parties.
The courts of appeals have generally ruled that compliance orders issued
under federal environmental laws are not subject to judicial review be-
cause they are not final agency actions.9 °
While Congress was considering the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, the Department of Defense was litigating the scope of federal
liability to pay state fees under the Clean Air Act;9 Congress addressed the
issue in the 1990 Amendments. The revised waiver provision obligated
federal agencies to pay any "fee or charge imposed by any State or local
agency to defray the costs of its air pollution regulatory program."92
4 Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2000)).
88 United States v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d 1071, 1072 (3d Cir. 1991).
88 Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998).
United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529, 534-35 (6th Cir. 1999).
s 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2000).
See Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d at 1074-75.
s See, e.g., Acker v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2002); Solar
Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1079 (3d Cir. 1989); Asbestec Constr. Serv. Inc. v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 849 F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1988). But see Allsteel Inc. v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 25 F.3d 312,315 (6th Cir. 1994) (order to stop construction was a final
agency action because it imposed legal obligations beyond those of the statute). Contra
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1020 (2004) (TVA not bound by EPA order because it was not a final agency action).
" For a description of the litigation and its outcome, see Murchison, supra note 17, at 189
n.65.92 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101(e), 104 Stat. 2399,2409
2008] 373
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
Congress also expanded the Clean Air Act waiver by adding inspection
and maintenance provisions for government vehicles and for vehicles
operated on federal installations, 93 but it did not change the language
of the 1977 Amendments regarding the sanctions covered by the waiver
of immunity.
As described above, the lower federal courts had split on the
question of the extent to which waivers in the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, and the Resource Conservation Act subjected federal agencies
to civil penalties imposed by federal agencies. In Department of Energy v.
Ohio,94 the United States Supreme Court definitively resolved the issue
for the waivers of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act: each statute permitted penalties only when imposed
by judges to enforce prior orders of the court; neither waived federal im-
munity with respect to administrative or judicial penalties imposed for
past violations.95
The most notable aspect of Justice Souter's majority opinion in
Department of Energy is its emphatic reaffirmation of the rule of strict
construction for all waivers of federal immunity. According to Justice
Souter, the principle of strict construction was "a common rule, with
which we presume congressional familiarity."96
The premise for the Court's narrow construction of the waivers
in the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
was a distinction between "coercive" and "punitive" penalties, a distinction
not previously drawn in environmental enforcement. "Coercive" penalties,
in Justice Souter's lexicon, are sanctions imposed to "induce" compliance
"with injunctions or other judicial orders designed to modify behavior
prospectively."97 In contrast, "punitive" sanctions are "imposed to punish
past violations of those statutes or state laws supplanting them."9" In the
Court's view, neither statute contained a "clear and unequivocal waiver"
of immunity to punitive civil penalties, and the Court was unwilling to
infer "a broader waiver."99
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a)(2)(B) (2000)).93 Id. §§ 235, 302(d), 104 Stat. at 2530, 2574 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7418(c), (d) (2000)).
94 503 U.S. 607 (1992).95 Id. at 615, 632.96 Id. at 615.
97 Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
98 Id. at 614.
99 Id. at 619.
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The citizen suit provision of each statute before the Court allowed
states and private parties to enforce the federal law against federal agen-
cies and also allowed the district court to apply any appropriate civil
penalties under the relevant statute. 0 That language was not, however,
sufficiently clear to subject the federal government to punitive civil pen-
alties. Each statute provided that civil penalties could only be assessed
against "persons," and neither included the United States or its agencies
within its definition of person.11
The Court had the most difficulty with the waiver found in section
313 of the Clean Water Act. That section subjects the federal government
to "all Federal, State, interstate, and local ... process and sanctions respect-
ing the control and abatement of water pollution," but it limits federal
liability for civil penalties to those "arising under Federal law or imposed
by a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court."10 2
Conceding that the term "sanctions" might be used to include both
coercive and punitive penalties, Justice Souter found three reasons in the
statutory context for limiting the text to coercive penalties. First, the stat-
utory provision distinguished "substantive requirements... from judicial
process, even though each might require the same conduct.' 0 3 Second, the
statute joined sanctions with "process" rather than with "requirements."
Third, the statute referred to the "enforcement" of sanctions, which would
presumably occur in the future. 4
Nor was the provision limiting federal liability to civil penalties
"arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce
an order or process of such courts" adequate to constitute a clear and un-
equivocal waiver with respect to punitive penalties arising under federal
law." 5 The federal statute authorized civil penalties to be imposed against
"any person" but the statute's definition of person did not include the
United States. Dismissing the state's assertion that punitive sanctions
were needed to deter federal violations as "not ... self-evident," Justice
Souter relied on cases interpreting the federal question jurisdiction of
the federal courts to conclude that penalties imposed under an approved
100 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act prior to 1992 amendment).
101 33 U.S.C. §§ 309(d), 502(15) (2000) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15), 6928(a)
(1988) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
102 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000).
103 Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 623.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 631.
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state permit program did not "arise" under federal law merely because
the Environmental Protection Agency had approved the permit program
under the Clean Water Act. Recognizing that this interpretation of the
statute gave no "satisfactory" meaning to the phrase "arising under fed-
eral law," Justice Souter nonetheless concluded the "rule of narrow con-
struction... takes the waiver no further than... coercive [penalties]."1°6
Interpretation of the waiver of immunity in the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act was much less problematic. The only language
referring to sanctions in the statutory text included an express reference
to state and federal courts.' 7 This reference was sufficient to bar "any in-
ference that a waiver of immunity from 'requirements' somehow unques-
tionably extends to punitive fines that are never so much as mentioned.'
When the Supreme Court opinion in Department of Energy was
announced, Congress was debating the reauthorization of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. Although Congress failed to pass a re-
authorization bill, it did enact the Federal Facility Compliance Act.'0 9 The
new law partially reversed Department of Energy by allowing civil pen-
alties to be imposed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. °"0
The Federal Facilities Compliance Act significantly expanded the
waiver of federal immunity in the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act."' The congressional intent to reverse the Supreme Court's holding
10 6 Id. at 627.
107 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988).
..
8 Dep't of Energy, 503 U.S. at 628. For a similar conclusion about the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act waiver even pursuant to an analytic framework that rejected
the rule of strict construction, see Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement,
supra note 17, at 221.
109 Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (2000)).
"
01 Id. § 102, 106 Stat. at 1505.
'11 In addition to listing punitive civil penalties among the sanctions to which federal
agencies are subject, the 1992 legislation also covered a variety of other matters. The
revised waiver substantially enhanced the enforcement authority of the EPA Administrator
over federal agencies. Specifically, it authorizes the Administrator to institute "an admin-
istrative enforcement action" against any federal agency "pursuant to the enforcement
authorities contained in this Act." Id. § 102, 106 Stat. at 1506. Moreover, the new law
requires that enforcement actions be initiated against federal agencies "in the same
manner and under the same circumstances as an action would be initiated against another
person" and that "any voluntary resolution or settlement ... be set forth in a consent
order." Id. Federal agencies did, however, get one special procedural concession: before
any administrative order becomes "final," the Administrator must give the agency "the
opportunity to confer with the administrator." Id. The 1992 legislation also increased the
number of inspections to which federal facilities are subject. It mandates that the EPA
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in Department of Energy is obvious on the face of the Federal Facility
Compliance Act. The statute extended the definition of the requirements
to which immunity is waived to encompass "all administrative orders and
all civil and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether
such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed
for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations."112 It also amended
the definition of "person" in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
to "include each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United
States.""3 According to the House Committee Report, even the Assistant
Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources division agreed that
"the language of this legislation evidences a clear and effective waiver of
the sovereign immunity of the United States from civil and administrative
penalties for violations of... hazardous waste laws.""4
The new law did not give states unfettered discretion with respect
to the use of civil penalties collected from federal agencies. Unless a pre-
existing law or a provision of a "State constitution requires the funds to
be used in a different manner," the Federal Facilities Compliance Act pro-
vides that a state can only use penalties paid by the federal government
inspect each federal facility annually and obligates the agencies to reimburse the EPA for
the costs of the inspections; it also allows any state with a federally approved hazardous
waste program to inspect federal facilities. Id. § 104, 106 Stat. at 1507-08.
In enacting the Federal Facility Compliance Act, Congress showed some sensi-
tivity to special problems faced by certain agencies, including the Department of Defense.
The Act provided special rules for "mixed wastes," hazardous wastes generated on public
vessels, military munitions, and federally owned treatment works. Id. § 105, 106 Stat.
at 1508-10.
112 Id. § 102(a)(3), 106 Stat. 1505 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a)(2000)). Appendix A con-
tains the full text of the waiver of federal immunity in the Federal Facilities Compliance
Act.
The legislative history reflects some disagreement over the appropriate source
of funds to pay civil penalties. The House Committee suggested that payment should come
from the "judgment fund" appropriation when an agency disputed its liability and referred
the matter to the Justice Department for defense. H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
15 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287, 1301. When President Bush signed the
Federal Facility Compliance Act, however, he issued a statement declaring that "fines or
penalties imposed as a result of this legislation will be paid from agency funds, unless
otherwise required by law." Presidential Statement Upon Signing H.R. 2194,28 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOc. 1868 (Oct. 12, 1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1337-1, 1337-1,
1337-2 (1992).
11 Federal Facility Compliance Act § 103, 106 Stat. at 1507 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
6903(15) (2000)).
114 H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1287, 1301.
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"for projects designed to improve or [to] protect the environment or to
defray the costs of environmental protection or enforcement.
" 115
Another liability question that the Federal Facility Compliance Act
attempted to resolve was what are the "reasonable service charges" that can
be assessed against federal agencies."' The 1992 Act contains a non-
exclusive list of permissible charges that includes fees "assessed in con-
nection with the" issuance, renewal, or amendment of permits; the "review
of plans, studies, and other documents;" or the "inspection or monitoring of
facilities.""' In addition, regulators can impose "any other nondiscrimina-
tory charges that are assessed in connection with a Federal, State, inter-
state, or local solid waste or hazardous waste regulatory program."118
An amendment to the first sentence of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act waiver further expanded regulatory control over
federal agencies. Now, the statute expressly waives federal immunity to
requirements respecting the "management" of hazardous waste as well
as those concerning the disposal of such waste." 9
The new law also clarified the extent to which federal employees
are subject to the sanctions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
It prohibits holding an individual agent, officer, or employee "personally
liable for any civil penalty" that arises from "any act or omission within
the scope of... official duties."'2 ° It does, however, subject agents, officers,
and employees (but not any federal agency or instrumentality) to "any
criminal sanction (including, but not limited to, any fine or imprisonment)
under any Federal or State solid or hazardous waste law." 2' According
to the Senate Report, this section did not "alter the standard for, impose,
or otherwise affect any criminal liability of any Federal employee."1 22 With
respect to federal prosecutions, the report appears accurate; several courts
of appeal have affirmed convictions of federal employees for violating fed-
"' Federal Facility Compliance Act § 103, 106 Stat. at 1506 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961(c)).
116 Id. § 102(a)(3), 106 Stat. at 1505 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a)).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. § 102(a)(2), 106 Stat. at 1505 (amended 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a)). In a decision that
preceded the Supreme Court's opinion in Department of Energy, the Ninth Circuit had
ruled that the waiver in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was broad enough
to encompass state regulation of the "collection" of solid waste even prior to the amend-
ment described in the text. Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 1988).
120 Federal Facility Compliance Act § 102(a)(4), 106 Stat. at 1505 (amending 42 U.S.C. §
6961(a)).
121 Id. § 102(a)(3), 106 Stat. at 1505-06 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a)).
122 S. REP. No. 102-67 (1991).
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eral environmental laws. 2 ' However, the language is arguably inconsistent
with a Ninth Circuit decision in which the court refused to allow a state
prosecution of the Administrator of the Veterans Administration when
the parties agreed that the prosecution was "essentially one against the
United States.' 24
The Federal Facility Compliance Act was an important step in the
evolution of the waivers of immunity found in federal environmental stat-
utes. Equally important to note, however, are two changes that the Act did
not make. It did not alter any waiver except the one found in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, and it did not abrogate the rule of strict
construction that the Supreme Court reaffirmed in the Department of
Energy case.
Congress has not addressed the waiver problem in a comprehen-
sive way since the enactment of the Federal Facility Compliance Act in
1992. It has neither enacted a general waiver applicable to all environ-
mental statutes nor reconsidered the waivers in each environmental stat-
ute. Congress did, however, revisit the waiver in the Safe Drinking Water
Act when it amended that statute in 1996.125 The Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendment follows the Federal Facility Compliance Act in two respects.
It subjects federal agencies to "all administrative orders and all civil and
administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties
or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated, in-
termittent, or continuing violations."26 It also provides that unless a pre-
existing state law or a state constitutional provision "requires the funds
to be used in a different manner," states must use "all funds" they collect
"only for projects designed to improve or protect the environment or to
defray the costs of environmental protection or enforcement."
127
123 See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 988 F.2d 946,949 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
862 (1993); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 919 (1991).
124 California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1985).
125 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2000)).
126 Id. § 129, 110 Stat. at 1660 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(a) (2000)).
127 Id. §129 (c), 110 Stat. at 1662 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a) (2000)). The Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendment also establishes a scheme to assess federal adminis-
trative penalties against federal facilities. It authorizes the EPA Administrator to assess
a penalty against federal agencies of not more than $25,000 per day when the admin-
istrator "finds that a Federal agency has violated an applicable requirement" of the Act.
Id. § 129 (b)(1), 110 Stat. at 1661 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(b) (2000)).
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Although Department of Energy is the Supreme Court's last
decision regarding an environmental waiver, the 1992 decision has not
eliminated litigation regarding the waivers that Congress has left un-
amended. Cases raising two issues, liability for civil penalties under the
Clean Air Act and the duty to prevent violations of water quality stan-
dards by nonpoint sources, produced new appellate decisions by the Sixth
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit during 1998 to 1999.12
Before and after the Supreme Court's Department of Energy de-
cision, federal agencies have resisted paying civil penalties under the
Clean Air Act. The House Report on the 1977 amendment to section 118
declared that the amendment would subject the federal government to
civil penalties,'129 and administrative and judicial decisions prior to 1992
generally held the federal government liable for the penalties. During the
1970s to 1980s, at least one federal district court and the Comptroller
General rejected claims that federal agencies were immune from state
penalties for violating air pollution laws. 3 °
Justice Souter's reaffirmation of the canon of strict construction
in Department of Energy prompted renewed resistance to payment of civil
penalties under the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act was similar, the
federal agencies argued, to the waivers involved in Department of Energy,
particularly the Clean Water Act waiver. Thus, the United States claimed,
the Supreme Court rationale should also preclude liability for "punitive"
civil penalties under the air law.
The federal government prevailed in two of the three district courts
in which the issue was initially litigated. District judges in the Northern
District of Georgia and the Eastern District of California held that the
air waiver was similar enough to the Clean Water Act provision to make
the Department of Energy rationale controlling. 3 '
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee reached the opposite conclusion regarding the air waiver,
ruling that the "plain language" of section 118 of the Clean Air Act com-
bined with the "repeated use of inclusive language, such as 'any' and 'all"
128 United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 1999); Idaho
Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
129 H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1089-90.
130 Ala. ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986);
Comptroller General Opinion No. B-194508, 58 U.S. Comp. Gen. 667, 667-68 (1979).
131 Cal. ex rel Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 29 F. Supp.
2d 652 (E.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 215 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res., 897 F. Supp. 1464 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
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showed a congressional intent to subject federal agencies to punitive
penalties under the Clean Air Act. 132 The Tennessee Court listed several
reasons why the Department of Energy opinion did not control the inter-
pretation of the air waiver. First, the text supported a different result.
The Supreme Court opinion had emphasized the language of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act connecting the
waivers to sanctions to enforce court orders; by contrast, Congress had
omitted that phrase when it amended the Clean Air Act waiver in
1977."' Moreover, Congress had added a provision to the Clean Air Act
exempting "particular individuals, but not agencies" from civil
penalties."' Second, the Court's decision was consistent with prior
administrative and judicial interpretations of the Act.'35 Third, the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act included a separate provision
subjecting the United States to administrative and judicial sanctions in
state agencies and courts.136 Fourth, the legislative history of the Clean
Air Act and sound public policy supported the Court's interpretation.
137
The Sixth Circuit was the first appellate court to address the issue,
and it affirmed the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
without deciding whether the waiver of federal immunity section of the
Clean Air Act was sufficiently different from the waivers in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act to distinguish
Department of Energy.3 ' Instead, the court of appeals focused on
subsection (e) of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, a
provision that had no parallel in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act or the Clean Water Act. Acknowledging that any waiver
"must be 'unequivocally expressed in statutory text' . . . [and] strictly
132 United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 967 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (M.D.
Tenn. 1997).
133 Id. at 980.
134 Id. at 980-81.
"
5 Id. at 981 (citing Comptroller General Opinion No. B-191747, 1978 WL 9814 (1978));
Ala. ex rel. Graddick, 648 F. Supp. at 1209; United States v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732, 733 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
136 Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 967 F. Supp. at 981-82.
137 Id. at 982-84.
138 United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529, 530-31 (6th Cir. 1999).
See generally Stephan J. Schlegelmich, The Clean Air Act, Sovereign Immunity, and
Sleight of Hand in the Sixth Circuit: United States v. Tennessee Air Pollution Control
Board, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 933 (2000).
20081
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
construed in favor of the United States," the Sixth Circuit found that the
Clean Air Act met those "stringent rules."39
Subsection (e) of the Clean Air Act declares that courts are not to
construe anything in the citizen suit provision "or in any other law of the
United States" to preclude "any State, local, or interstate authority from...
obtaining any judicial remedy or sanction in any State or local court,
or... obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction."4 ' According to
the Sixth Circuit, the words "any administrative remedy or sanction" were
sufficient to cover the civil penalties imposed by Tennessee because no
qualification suggested that the remedies or sanctions had to be "prospec-
tive, coercive" sanctions."'4 Similarly, the declaration that nothing in "any
other law" was to restrict the government's liability included "the law
relating to sovereign immunity."' Nor was the court persuaded by the
government's argument that subsection (e) could not "effect a waiver...
because it is merely a savings clause." 43 To the contrary, the court of
appeals concluded that "[i]f words have meaning," subsection (e) "says that
no law shall restrict the State of Tennessee from obtaining any adminis-
trative remedy or sanction against a federal air polluter."'
In light of the clarity of subsection (e), the Sixth Circuit found "it
unnecessary to decide" if the district court had correctly ruled that the
waiver in section 118 of the Clean Air Act was sufficiently different from
the waivers in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean
Air Act to distinguish Department of Energy.'45 Nor did the court accept
the argument that the reference to section 118 in the last sentence of sub-
section (e) made the new subsection solely dependent on section 118. To
the contrary, the cross reference "simply reminds the reader that [section
1181 defines the United States' burden to comply with state laws;" sub-
section (e) of the citizen suit "expansively and unambiguously removes
any impediment to enforcement in the event of noncompliance."146
Near the end of the decade, the Ninth Circuit turned to a waiver
issue involving the Clean Water Act, the question of whether a federal
139 Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d at 531.
140 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2000).
141 Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d at 532.
142Id.
143 Id.
'4 Id. at 533.
145 Id. The court of appeals did indicate that it was "sympathetic to the [district] court's
conclusion." Id.
146 Id.
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agency could be required to comply with state controls on nonpoint sources
of water pollution when violations of those controls were causing viola-
tions of state water quality standards.147 A 1987 decision had ruled that
the Clean Water Act waiver extended to state "water quality standards
enforceable under"148 the federal statute and that review of federal
compliance with the water quality standards was available under the
Administrative Procedure Act.149 In 1998, Idaho Sporting Congress v.
Thomas extended the review under the Administrative Procedure Act to
include pollution from nonpoint sources when that pollution contributed
to the violation of water quality standards.5
Idaho Sporting Congress involved a challenge to timber sales by the
Forest Service. The principal challenge concerned the failure to prepare an
environmental impact system for the sales, and the court of appeals
remanded the case for preparation of a statement."' Nonetheless, after
determining that an impact statement was required, the court briefly
considered the Clean Water Act claims raised by the plaintiffs. The court
unequivocally ruled that "all federal agencies must comply with state water
quality standards, including a state's antidegradation policy" and that
" UWudicial review of the requirement is available under the Administrative
Procedure Act" for nonpoint sources.152 However, the court of appeals
deferred determining whether a violation had occurred in the case before it.
"[U]ntil further studies are completed" in connection with the environmen-
tal impact statement, the court concluded, it lacked "sufficient facts" to
determine whether the state's water quality standards had been violated.'53
147 Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
141 Or. Natural Res. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1987).
149 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
15 Idaho Sporting Cong., 137 F.3d at 1153. For an article criticizing the Idaho Sporting
Congress court for assuming that all nonpoint source provisions in state water quality
regulation created judicially enforceable standards, see Robin Kundis Craig, Idaho Sporting
Congress v. Thomas and Sovereign Immunity: Federal Facility Nonpoint Sources, the
APA, and the Meaning of "In the Same Manner and to the Same Extent as Any Non-
governmental Entity," 30 ENVTL. L. 527 (2000).
151 Idaho Sporting Cong., 137 F.3d at 1154.
1
5 2 Id. at 1153.
153 Id.
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D. Developments Since 2000: Continued Conflict Over Clean Air
Act Enforcement
Since 2000, the litigation involving waivers of immunity has
focused on whether federal agencies have to pay civil penalties to the
states under the Clean Air Act. The reported decisions conflict. The Ninth
Circuit avoided the substantive issue by holding that the federal govern-
ment could not remove an enforcement action filed in state court to
federal district court.' The Eleventh Circuit rejected that holding as
well as the Sixth Circuit's 1999 decision,'55 ruling that the federal govern-
ment was liable for civil penalties under the Clean Air Act.'56
Although the Ninth Circuit decided its case on jurisdictional
grounds, its decision produced the same result-federal liability for puni-
tive penalties imposed by the state-as the earlier Sixth Circuit decision
that reached the merits of the waiver issue. In 1999, the Sacramento Area
Metropolitan Air Quality Management District commenced an enforce-
ment action in state court against the United States for $13,050 in civil
penalties. The United States removed the action to federal district court,
and the district court ruled that the Clean Air Act did not waive the fed-
eral government's immunity for civil penalties for past violations.15 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit decided removal was improper, so it reversed
the district court and remanded the case to the state court. 158 The state
court subsequently ruled in favor of the air quality management district,
and the United States elected to pay the penalty rather than to appeal. 59
Even though the Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Manage-
ment District had not challenged the removal to federal court, the court
of appeals concluded that it was obligated to resolve the jurisdictional
issue: "If the district court lacked jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on
appeal to correct the jurisdictional error, but not to entertain the merits
... Cal. ex rel Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005,
1014 (9th Cir. 2000).
"' United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 1999).
151 Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2005); City of
Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
157 Cal. ex rel. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 29 F. Supp.
2d 652, 656-57 (E.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd 215 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2000).
l Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 215 F.3d at 1015.
'5 Email from Kathy Pittard, District Counsel, Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality
Management District, to the author (March 23, 2007).
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of the dispute."16 ° In deciding that removal was improper, the Ninth Circuit
focused on the language of subsection (e) of the Clean Air Act citizen suit
section, a provision that was added to the statute in 1977. That language
"specifically protect[ed] the right of state and local governments to obtain
remedies or sanctions against the federal government in a nonfederal
forum pursuant to state and local air quality laws."161 Conceding that the
1977 Amendment did "not expressly prevent the federal government from
removing actions from state and local courts," the Ninth Circuit none-
theless concluded that its "plain text unequivocally demonstrates that
Congress intended to prevent the removal of a covered action to federal
court."'62 In the view of the appellate court, "guaranteeing the right of
state and local governments to obtain judicial remedies and sanctions in
state and local courts... necessarily prohibits the removal of actions that
are brought by state and local governments pursuant to their own air
quality laws."'63
More recently, the dispute over the federal government's liability
for civil penalties under the Clean Air Act has taken another new turn.
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the approaches of both the Sixth Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit. It has allowed the federal government to remove
state enforcement actions to federal court, and it has construed the Clean
Air Act waiver as limited to "coercive" civil penalties.
Like the Ninth Circuit case, City of Jacksonville v. Department of
the Navy originated as a state court action.'64 The city sought civil penalties
0 Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 215 F.3d at 1009.
161 Id.
'
6 2 Id. at 1011. Even though the final version of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
deleted a provision expressly prohibiting removal "without explanation," the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the legislative history supported its decision that Congress intended
subsection (e) of the citizen suit provision to preclude removal. Id. at 1012. That history,
the court of appeals noted, shows "Congress's manifest frustration with the federal govern-
ment's laggard and obstinate approach towards complying with state and local air quality
laws." Id. at 1011. In addition, the silence of the air waiver contrasted sharply with the
contemporaneous denial of any intent to preclude removal in the 1977 amendment to the
Clean Water Act waiver. Id. citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-294 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1277-78.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that it might have independent
jurisdiction of the case under the general federal question statute. That statute was in-
applicable, the court ruled, because the federal issue was presented when the United
States raised its sovereign immunity defense, not as part of the plaintiffs claim. Id. at
1014-15.1 63 Id. at 1011.
16 City of Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
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for more than 250 alleged violations of state and local air pollution con-
trol laws. The Navy removed the case to federal district court, and the
district court denied a motion to remand the case to state court. 165 The
district court also denied the Navy's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that federal immunity barred the suit, but the trial court cer-
tified that ruling for interlocutory review by the Eleventh Circuit.
166
The court of appeals decided both claims in favor of the United
States. It held that removal to federal court was proper and that neither
section 118 nor subsection (e) of the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision
waived federal immunity from punitive penalties.167
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the removal issue by
noting that the authority for federal agencies to remove cases to federal
court was a recent addition to federal jurisdictional statutes.' 68 Prior to
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) only authorized removal by federal officers
who were sued for acts taken under color of their offices. The 1996 amend-
ment also allowed removal by the United States and its agencies.' 69 The
committee reports on the 1996 amendment indicated that one reason
Congress changed the removal statute was to allow immunity claims to
be adjudicated in federal court. 7 °
In light of the text and legislative history of the 1996 amendment,
the Eleventh Circuit held that subsection (e) of the Clean Air Act citizen
suit provision did not preclude removal. Congress added subsection (e),
the appellate court noted, nearly twenty years before it amended the
removal statute to permit federal agencies to remove cases to federal
court. This chronology caused the court to "doubt that Congress in 1977
intended to preclude removal by the United States" when Congress did not
"even contemplat[e] the authorization of removal by the federal govern-
ment" until 1996.' 71 In any event, the language of subsection (e) did not
show "a 'clear and manifest' intent.., to preclude removal in this action."
72
Indeed, the appellate court concluded the provisions did not even conflict
because it was possible to give them both full effect: "state and local
'
65 City ofJacksonville v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
,
66 Id. at 1358-59.
167 City of Jacksonville, 348 F.3d at 1313, 1319.
1681 d. at 1311.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1310 (quoting H. REP. No. 104-798, at 20 (1996); S. REP. No. 104-366, at 30-31
(1996)).
171 Id. at 1311.
172Id. at 1311-12.
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governments may bring enforcement actions in state courts pursuant to
[subsection (e)] and the United States may then remove these actions so
long as the federal government complies with the requirements of' the
removal statute. 173 As a final argument for finding no prohibition of
removal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that an early version of the 1977
Amendments to the Clean Air Act expressly prohibited removal of actions
to federal court. Congress, however, deleted that provision before enacting
the legislation; in the Eleventh Circuit's view, that deletion contradicted
any inference that Congress meant to forbid removal.174
After upholding federal jurisdiction, the court of appeals reversed
the district court's denial of the motion for summary judgment filed by
the Navy. In the view of the appellate court, neither the waiver of immu-
nity in section 118 nor subsection (e) of the citizen suit provision met the
Supreme Court's requirement that "a waiver of sovereign immunity with
regard to punitive penalties . ..be unequivocally expressed in the
statutory text."1
75
With respect to the waiver in section 118, the Eleventh Circuit
regarded the Supreme Court decision in Department of Energy as dis-
positive. In that case, the court of appeals declared, the Court had ruled
that "similar, if not identical, language" in the federal facilities provision
of the Clean Water Act waived immunity only with respect to coercive, not
punitive, civil penalties.'76 As is true in the Clean Water Act provision,
"each time the word 'sanction' appears in [section 1181 of the [Clean Air
Act], it is within the phrase 'process and sanction[s].'"77 The Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged that the Department of Energy opinion "did discuss"
a phrase not found in the Clean Air Act, the phrase in the Clean Water Act
limiting federal liability to civil penalties imposed by a court "to enforce
an order or the process of such court."'78 According to the appellate court,
that language "serves a clarifying function," but was not "the basis for
the Supreme Court's decision."'79 Thus, the linguistic distinction between
the two provisions was insufficient to make the Clean Air Act waiver applic-
able to punitive penalties.
173 Id. at 1312.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1314.
176 Id. at 1315.
177 Id. at 1316.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1316-17.
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The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the claim that subsection (e)
of the citizen suit provision extended the Clean Air Act waiver to puni-
tive penalties. Disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit this time, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the omission of the word "process" from subsec-
tion (e)'s waiver of immunity to "any judicial remedy or sanction" was not
sufficient to broaden the waiver. 0 Construing "the phrase 'remedy or
sanction' in context," the court concluded that "the lack of any clarifying
language" within subsection (e) did not create a presumption that Congress
intended the phrase to have "the broadest conceivable definition."'
Lacking "express intent from Congress," the court declined, therefore, to
"interpret the broad language of the citizen suit provision to provide a
larger scope of waiver of immunity" than section 118.182
Just over a year after the City of Jacksonville decision was issued,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected one final argument that the Clean Air Act
waived immunity to punitive penalties.8 3 The court held that the autho-
rization in the second sentence of subsection (a) of the Clean Air Act
citizen suit provision for federal district courts to impose "appropriate
civil penalties" did not broaden the waiver of federal immunity because
the authorization did not expressly apply to the federal government.'8
The "inclusion of the United States" in the first sentence of subsection (a)
did "not necessarily carry over to the grant of power to ... impose civil
penalties."8 5 Unlike the text of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, sub-
section (a) of the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision was not a "clear and
unambiguous" waiver of immunity for punitive penalties. The Eleventh
Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court judgment granting the United
States summary judgment on the issue of liability for civil penalties for
past violations.8
6
III. A SUMMARY OF CURRENT RULES
The current rules relating to waivers of federal immunity in envi-
ronmental statutes form a confusing mess that implements no consistent
and coherent policy. They are explainable only by reference to the compli-
'
8 0 Id. at 1318.
181 Id. at 1319.
182 Id.
183 Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1357 (11th Cir. 2005).
'84 Id. at 1355.
18 5 Id. at 1356.
186 Id. at 1357.
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cated history of specific statutory provisions, narrow judicial interpreta-
tions, and limited legislative revisions described in the preceding section.
A. A Few Exceptions
Although waivers of immunity are extremely common in federal
environmental statutes, Congress has never enacted a general waiver for
environmental regulations, and the trend toward waivers in particular
statutes is not yet universal. For example, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,18 v the Occupational Safety and Health
Act,' the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 8 9 the Coastal
Zone Management Act,19° and the Environmental Planning and Community
Right to Know Act' 9 ' all lack waiver provisions, although presidential
directives do sometimes direct compliance even without a waiver.' 92 Thus,
the starting point for any immunity issue must be to identify what pro-
vision, if any, purports to waive the federal government's immunity. More-
over, Department of Energy confirms that the rule of strict construction
still governs interpretation of the waivers Congress has enacted.
B. Waivers From the 1970s and the 1980s
Several environmental statutes contain waivers that were enacted
during the 1970s or 1980s. The text of the waivers in these statutes varies
significantly, but the language in all of them is narrower than the wording
that Congress chose in the Federal Facility Compliance Act.
187 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
18 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000). But see id. § 668(a) (requiring each federal agency "to
establish and maintain an effective and comprehensive occupational safety and health
program which is consistent with [federal] standards" for private employees).
189 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2000). But see id. § 1273(a) (stating that the Secretary of
Interior "shall promulgate and implement a Federal lands program which shall be appli-
cable to all surface coal mining and reclamation operations taking place pursuant to any
Federal law on any Federal lands"); id. § 1292(c) ("To the greatest extent practicable each
Federal agency shall cooperate with the Secretary and the States in carrying out the
provisions of this chapter.").
190 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000). But see id. § 1456(c)(1) (mandating federal agencies to
conduct their activities "to the maximum extent practicable [consistent] with the enforce-
able policies of approved State management programs.").
191 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000).
192 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,088, §§ 1-601 to 1-605, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978),
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,148, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,604 (April 25, 2000), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
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The Noise Control Act of 1972 contains the most restrictive waiver
of modem environmental statutes.193 The noise law still uses the "require-
ments" language that the 1976 decisions of the Supreme Court found in-
sufficient to require compliance with state procedural requirements.'94
Because neither the federal government nor the states have adopted sig-
nificant noise control regulations, Congress has felt little pressure to
update the waiver as it has done with the waivers in other pollution
control statutes.
In both 1976 and 1992, the Supreme Court decisions involved
claims brought under the Clean Water Act. The 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Water Act broadened the statute's waiver to cover procedural as
well as substantive matters, 195 but the Federal Facility Compliance Act
enacted in 1992 only amended the waiver of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act. As a result, federal agencies are presently not subject
to civil punitive penalties for violations of the water law.
Despite the Supreme Court's decisions in 1976 and 1992, a few
issues regarding the Clean Water Act waiver remain unresolved. Several
lower court decisions have allowed federal agencies access to federal court
to challenge their obligations under state water pollution control laws.'96
Others have limited the federal obligation under the water law to compli-
ance with numerical standards. 197 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
has applied the waiver to state standards applicable to nonpoint sources.'98
The chapter of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regu-
lating underground storage tanks, which was added to the statute in 1984,
is also probably insufficient to permit imposition of civil penalties for past
violations.'99 The waiver for underground tanks is based on the general
waiver in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act prior to its amend-
ment by the Federal Facilities Compliance Act.200 However, the under-
ground storage tank law differs from the statutes before the Supreme
Court in Department of Energy in one significant respect: it defines the
term "person" to include federal agencies.20 '
'9 See 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2000).
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
'6 See supra notes 66, 91 and accompanying text.
19' See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
's See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
199 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991m (2000).
200 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 6991ffa) (West 2007).
20142 U.S.C.A. § 6991(6) (West 2007) (underground storage tanks chapter of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act).
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The inclusion of the federal government within the definition of
"person" is unlikely to subject federal agencies to punitive civil penalties
for violations relating to underground storage tanks. As in the waiver of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act prior to its 1992 amendment
by the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, the only reference to sanctions
in the waiver of federal immunity for underground storage tanks comes
in a sentence regarding the enforcement of injunctive relief.2 2
The waiver in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act is a curi-
ous one. It only applies when the federal government uses a non-federal
disposal facility, and it contains no reference to sanctions. At the same time,
it contains the broadest waivers with respect to monetary charges. Federal
agencies are liable for all "fees, taxes, and surcharges imposed by the
compact commission, and by the State in which such facility is located.,
20 3
Of the statutes enacted in the 1980s, the Medical Waste Tracking
Act is the one whose provisions are most likely to allow imposition of puni-
tive civil penalties against federal agencies. Its waiver provision expressly
extends, but is not limited, to "civil, criminal, and administrative penalties,"
and it also includes federal agencies within the definition of "person."
214
However, enforcement of civil penalties will probably require an action
under state law. Only the EPA Administrator can impose penalties under
the federal statute, which contains no provision authorizing citizen suits.
2 5
C. Broader Waivers From the 1990s
In the 1990s, Congress amended the waivers of both the Clean Air
Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Both amendments
expanded the waivers previously found in the statutes.
The change in the Clean Air Act waiver concerned federal liability
for charges imposed by state regulators. After the 1990 amendment, the
Clean Air Act waiver obligates the federal government "to pay a fee or
charge imposed by any State or local agency to defray the costs of its air
pollution regulatory program."20 6 Although the amendment omits any re-
quirement that the fees or charges be nondiscriminatory, that require-
ment is implicit in the general wording of the waiver, which only applies "to
202 Id. § 6991f(a).
203 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(b)(1)(B) (2000).
204 Id. § 6992e.
205 See id. § 6992d.
206 Id. § 7418(a).
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the same extent" as requirements apply to "any nongovernmental entity."217
The revised waiver does not expressly encompass taxes, but the addition
of the word "charge" is probably sufficient to require the federal govern-
ment to contribute to the overhead costs of the state regulatory program.
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act did not expressly
address the sanctions issue, presumably because the amendments preceded
the Supreme Court decision in the Department of Energy case. Unfortu-
nately, the failure to address the issue leaves considerable uncertainty
with respect to the sanctions to which federal agencies are subject when
they violate air pollution control laws. The main sentence of the Clean Air
Act waiver is similar to the language of the Clean Water Act except that
the Clean Air Act omits the troublesome reference to "civil penalties
arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce
an order or the process of such court."20 1 One can also distinguish the
Department ofEnergy holding on at least four additional grounds. First, the
Clean Air Act includes federal agencies within its definition of
"person," " and the omission of the United States from the definition of per-
son in the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act was an important link in the Supreme Court's reasoning in Department
of 2nergy.1 Second, the citizen suit provision in the air law contains an
express disavowal of any intent to restrict any "State, local, or interstate
authority from... obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction in
any State or local administrative agency."211 Third, the House committee
report for the 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act waiver expressly de-
clared that the amendment subjects federal agencies to "civil penalties."212
Fourth, prior to the Supreme Court opinion in Department of Energy, both
judicial and administrative interpretations of the air waiver had found
it sufficient to allow imposition of civil penalties for past violations.213 As
described above, the circuits have split on the issue of whether these dis-
tinctions amount to a sufficiently clear and unequivocal waiver for the
imposition of punitive civil penalties against federal agencies.
207 Id.
208 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000), with 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2000).
209 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (2000).
210 U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1992).
211 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2000).
212 H.R. REP. No. 95-294,5, 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1082, 1089-90.
213 United States v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732, 734 (C.D. Cal.
1990); Ala. ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1986);
Comptroller General Opinion No. B-194508, 58 U.S. Comp. Gen. 667(1979).
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The question of whether state enforcement actions against federal
agencies for violations of air pollution laws can be removed to federal court
is also a difficult one. Congress did not expressly preclude removal in the
1977 Amendments, probably because at that time the removal statute
did not authorize removal of actions against federal agencies. When
Congress amended the removal statute in 1996, it did not directly ad-
dress the Clean Air Act issue, although the legislative history indicated
that one reason for the amendment was to permit review of sovereign
immunity issues in federal court.2
14
As described in the preceding section, the Federal Facility
Compliance Act greatly expands the sanctions to which federal agencies are
subject under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. In the com-
mittee hearing that preceded the adoption of the Act, even the representa-
tives of the Department of Justice conceded that the amended waiver
covers punitive civil penalties,21 and all recent decisions have assumed the
Federal Facility Compliance Act waiver is sufficient for civil penalties.1 6
The text of the Safe Drinking Water Act also seems adequate to
subject the federal government to civil penalties for past violations. It
mirrors the Federal Facility Compliance Act by expressly covering
"punitive" civil penalties 217 and including federal agencies within the
definition of "person."21
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE CURRENT MESS
A complete solution to the current confusion regarding federal
immunity from state environmental regulations will require legislative
action. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Congress embraced a
simple principle: the federal government should be subject to the same
requirements of state environmental law as any other person. That prin-
ciple was a dramatic change from prior law, and Congress has frequently
repeated it in federal environmental statutes. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretations of that language have bred a host of incon-
sistencies among various statutes. When Congress has amended environ-
24 See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., City of Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1319 (11th Cir.
2003).
217 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(a) (2000).
21 Id. § 300ff12).
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mental statutes after a Supreme Court interpretation, it has generally
overruled the Court's most recent interpretation, but it has not tried to
incorporate the revisions into other statutes that have not been the
subject of general revisions. The result is the differing language in the
federal statutes summarized in the preceding sections.
The policy initiated in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 is a
sound one. If achieving environmental goals are worth forcing individuals
and companies to bear the cost of complying with environmental stan-
dards, government agencies should also bear those costs in carrying out
their activities. Moreover, they should comply with permit and other pro-
cedural requirements so that regulators can determine if the agencies are
meeting their environmental compliance obligation. Likewise, sanctions-
including monetary penalties-are necessary to give agencies adequate
incentive to comply.
One can identify two valid federal interests that justify limiting the
waivers: the federal government should not face discriminatory enforce-
ment, and a safety outlet should exist when compliance would threaten
other vital national interests. The waivers in current environmental stat-
utes satisfy both of those concerns. By subjecting federal agencies to the
same requirements as other "persons" or "nongovernmental entities," the
environmental waivers protect the government from bearing a dispropor-
tionate share of the cost of environmental compliance. Likewise, the pro-
vision for presidential exemption from the waivers when required by the
"paramount interest" of the United States ensures that environmental
concerns will not frustrate other national interests.21 Requiring presi-
dential approval means that individual agencies will not routinely sacrifice
environmental concerns whenever they conflict with other agency objectives.
The best legislative approach to implement the waiver principle
would be a broader Federal Facilities Compliance Act identifying all of the
state environmental requirements to which Congress wanted to make the
federal government subject. Unfortunately, that solution is unlikely to
occur. The Conservation Foundation proposed a general federal environ-
mental protection code more than two decades ago,"' but the proposal
never gained any traction. The reasons are undoubtedly institutional and
219 See Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement, supra note 17; Pub. L. No.
91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970).
220 See Robert F. Blomquist, The Conservation Foundation's Proposed "Environmental
Protection Act": Prospects and Problems For an Integrated Pollution Control Code for the
United States, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 937 (1991).
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political. Different congressional committees are responsible for the var-
ious environmental statutes, and so any general environmental statute
would have to be approved by multiple committees. Second, convincing
Congress to pass a new statute is a daunting prospect that is likely to dis-
courage states and environmental organizations from investing limited
political capital on a relatively narrow project.
An alternate approach is to develop an expanded model for waiving
federal immunity and to insert the same language in federal environ-
mental statutes as they are revised. Although this method is slower and
is likely to result in some continued differences between waivers, it has
the potential to reduce the current fragmentation significantly if Congress
updates the major environmental statutes over the next decade. This
approach also has the virtue of political viability. All of the various con-
gressional committees with control over environmental statutes have been
willing to adopt broad federal waivers when they have enacted general
statutory broad revisions.
Whichever legislative approach is adopted, the Federal Facilities
Compliance Act offers a good starting point for reform. When the Act was
being considered by Congress, the Justice Department agreed that the
language was sufficient to subject federal agencies to liability for civil pen-
alties imposed for past violations, and all recent decisions assume that
it is. It also broadly defines the environmental fees that federal agencies
must pay.
Although the Federal Facilities Compliance Act provides a good
beginning, at least three additions to its provisions seem desirable. First,
Congress should explicitly overrule those cases limiting requirements to
numerical standards. Second, Congress should abrogate the rule of strict
construction; in its place, it should explicitly embrace a rule of liberal con-
struction that subjects the federal government to the same environmental
standards, procedures, processes, and sanctions as any nongovernmental
violator. Third, Congress should expressly decide whether state enforce-
ment actions against federal agencies can be removed to federal court. If
the other changes are made, removal to federal court probably should be
allowed. Once federal agencies are expressly subject to civil penalties for
past violations and non-numerical standards and Congress prescribes a
rule of liberal construction for the waivers, preservation of a federal forum
to resolve disputed issues seems to be a reasonable way to insure that
federal agencies are not subject to discriminatory state enforcement.
Given the Supreme Court's continued embrace of the rule of strict
construction, judicial decisions are unlikely to produce a complete solution
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to the current confusion. The Court can, however, mitigate some of the
uncertainty created by recent cases.
The current controversy over sanctions is whether federal agencies
are liable for civil penalties for past violations under the Clean Air Act.
As noted above,221 the text of section 118 of the Clean Air Act waiver is
similar to the language of the Clean Water Act, but one can distinguish
the air waiver on a number of grounds: the omission of the language limit-
ing the waiver to "civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by
a State or local court to enforce an order or the process of such court;"
222
the inclusion of federal agencies within the definition of"person;"2z the sen-
tence in subsection (e) of the citizen suit provision disavowing any intent
to "restrict any State... authority from... obtaining any judicial remedy
or sanction in any State... court;"224 the House committee report declaring
that the 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act waiver subjected federal
agencies to "civil penalties;"25 and the judicial and administrative inter-
pretations finding the air waiver sufficient to allow imposition of civil
penalties for past violations. Collectively, these differences between the
air and water waivers support the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the
waiver extends to past violations.226 The Eleventh Circuit's contrary opin-
ion rests on the misleading description of the Clean Air Act waiver as
similar, if not identical" to the Clean Water Act waiver. Moreover,its
comment that the Clean Air Act language is not as broad as the text of
the Federal Facility Compliance Act ignores the obvious reason for the
difference: Congress expanded the Clean Air Act waiver long before it had
the specific language of the Department of Energy opinion to overrule.
The related question of whether state enforcement actions for air
violations can be removed to federal court is even more difficult. 228 Congress
did not expressly preclude waiver in the 1977 amendment to the Clean
Air Act waiver for the obvious reason that Congress did not amend the
federal removal statute to allow removal of all actions against federal
221 See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
222 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (a) (2000).
223 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (2000).
224 Id. § 7604(e).
225 H.R. REP. No. 95-294,4 & 12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1082, 1089-90.
226 United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 185 F.3d 529, 531 (6th Cir. 1999);
see supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
227 City of Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2003);
see supra note 176 and accompanying text.228 See supra note 171-72 and accompanying text.
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agencies until 1996. The language of the amended removal statute con-
tains no exception for the Clean Air Act, and the legislative history indi-
cates that one reason for the change was a desire to allow immunity claims
to be litigated in federal court. Nonetheless, allowing removal of state
enforcement actions for air violations seems to contradict the decision
Congress made in subsection (e) of the Clean Air Act citizen suit section.
That sentence declares that "[niothing ... in any ... law of the United
States shall be construed to... restrict any State... from ... obtaining any
judicial remedy or sanction in any State... court."2 29 The Eleventh Circuit's
assertion that allowing removal does not conflict with section 7604(e) 2 0
simply ignores the statutory text quoted in the preceding sentence.
The lower federal courts have generally reached a sound consensus
on the liability of federal agencies for fees.23' So long as the fees imposed on
the agencies are the same as those imposed on other regulated entities and
are not used to support general state revenues, the principle underlying
waiver-that the federal government should be treated like any other
polluter-suggests that the federal agencies should also pay the fees.232
Despite the Supreme Court's emphatic endorsement of the rule
of strict construction for section 313 of the Clean Water Act in the
Department of Energy opinion, a few issues continue to be litigated. Some
lower courts have ruled that the water waiver does not extend to state
standards that are not expressed in numerical terms, while the Ninth
Circuit has held the waiver applicable to standards applicable to nonpoint
sources of water pollution.233 Proper resolution of these issues requires
one to return to the basic principle behind the waiver: if a standard is
enforceable against other persons, it should also be enforceable against
the United States.234 In addition, the decisions limiting the reach of the
Clean Water Act to numerical standards conflict with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the same "requirements" in other contexts. Decisions
construing the law regulating labeling for both cigarettes and pesticides
229 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2000).
230 City of Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
231 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
232 For a more extended analysis of the fee issue, see Murchison, Reforming Environmental
Enforcement, supra note 17, at 195-97, 214-18.
233 See supra notes 59-61, 151-53 and accompanying text.
114 For criticism of the Idaho Sporting Congress decision because it did not require that
state water quality regulations of nonpoint sources ofwater be judicially enforceable before
imposing them on the federal government, see Craig, supra note 150.
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have held that common law tort duties, the paradigm of non-numerical
standards, can constitute "requirements."235
CONCLUSION
In 1970, Congress tried to establish a new standard regarding
federal compliance with pollution control laws: federal agencies were to
be treated like "any other person." The Supreme Court's rigid reliance
on the rule of strict construction for waivers of federal immunity has
frustrated that congressional goal. Other persons have always had to
comply with the permit requirements of federal environmental laws, but
the Supreme Court's 1976 decisions held that the federal government
was immune from such "procedural" requirements of the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act. Other persons are also subject to substantial
civil penalties when they violate environmental statutes, but in 1992 the
Supreme Court held that no civil penalties could be imposed on federal
agencies under the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act until an agency had violated an injunction entered after a
court determined that the agencies were violating the law.
Congress has only partially corrected the erroneous Supreme Court
rulings. In the decade following the 1976 decisions, Congress gradually
added permits and procedures to the text of the waiver in most important
federal statutes. Following the 1992 decision, Congress enacted the Federal
Facilities Compliance Act, but that statute only overruled the Supreme
Court decision with respect to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
The result is a confusing group of statutes that waive different
amounts of federal immunity for no apparent purpose. Congress should
correct this unfortunate situation by broadening slightly the waiver lan-
guage of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, and making the broader
language applicable to all federal environmental statutes either by a
235 See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 436 (2005) (stating that pro-
hibition against state "requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required under" federal pesticide law covered common-law duties as well as
regulations); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504,515 (1992) (noting that a statute
forbidding any "requirement or prohibition.., with respect to the advertising... of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with" federal law regulating
labeling of cigarettes preempted state tort claims, not just state regulations). Cf Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 259 (2004) (prohibition
against a stricter local "standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles" covered mandate to purchase low-emission vehicles as well as emission control
standards for engines).
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general waiver applicable to all environmental statutes or by a specific
amendment to each environmental statute. When expanding the existing
waivers, Congress should use the Federal Facilities Compliance Act as a
guide. In addition, Congress should clarify that federal agencies are sub-
ject to any type of standard that is also enforceable against other persons.
Furthermore, Congress should direct the courts to construe the waiver
liberally to achieve its purpose of treating the United States like any
other person subject to environmental regulations. If these changes are
made, Congress might well choose to grant agencies authority to remove
state enforcement actions to federal court.
Until Congress acts, the courts should apply the existing waivers
with more attention to congressional purpose and less to an overly technical
application of the rule of strict construction. This approach would subject
agencies to civil penalties for past violations under the Clean Air Act,
preclude removal of air violations to federal court, allow states to collect
nondiscriminatory fees from federal agencies, and subject federal agencies
to any standard that can be enforced against other persons.
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APPENDIX A
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT WAIVER AS AMENDED BY
THE FEDERAL FACILITIES COMPLIANCE ACT
(a) In general
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having
jurisdiction over any solid waste management facility or disposal site, or
(2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the disposal
or management of solid waste or hazardous waste shall be subject to,
and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
both substantive and procedural (including any requirement for permits or
reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as
may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief), respecting control and
abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste disposal and management
in the same manner, and to the same extent, as any person is subject to
such requirements, including the payment of reasonable service charges.
The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and procedural
requirements referred to in this subsection include, but are not limited
to, all administrative orders and all civil and administrative penalties
and fines, regardless of whether such penalties or fines are punitive or
coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continu-
ing violations. The United States hereby expressly waives any immunity
otherwise applicable to the United States with respect to any such
substantive or procedural requirement (including, but not limited to, any
injunctive relief, administrative order or civil or administrative penalty
or fine referred to in the preceding sentence, or reasonable service charge).
The reasonable service charges referred to in this subsection include, but
are not limited to, fees or charges assessed in connection with the
processing and issuance of permits, renewal of permits, amendments to
permits, review of plans, studies, and other documents, and inspection
and monitoring of facilities, as well as any other nondiscriminatory
charges that are assessed in connection with a Federal, State, interstate,
or local solid waste or hazardous waste regulatory program. Neither the
United States, nor any agent, employee, or officer thereof, shall be
immune or exempt from any process or sanction of any State or Federal
Court with respect to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief. No
agent, employee, or officer of the United States shall be personally liable
for any civil penalty under any Federal, State, interstate, or local solid
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or hazardous waste law with respect to any act or omission within the
scope of the official duties of the agent, employee, or officer. An agent,
employee, or officer of the United States shall be subject to any criminal
sanction (including, but not limited to, any fine or imprisonment) under
any Federal or State solid or hazardous waste law, but no department,
agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, orjudicial branch
of the Federal Government shall be subject to any such sanction. The
President may exempt any solid waste management facility of any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance
with such a requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest
of the United States to do so. No such exemption shall be granted due to
lack of appropriation unless the President shall have specifically requested
such appropriation as a part of the budgetary process and the Congress
shall have failed to make available such requested appropriation. Any
exemption shall be for a period not in excess of one year, but additional
exemptions may be granted for periods not to exceed one year upon the
President's making a new determination. The President shall report each
January to the Congress all exemptions from the requirements of this
section granted during the preceding calendar year, together with his
reason or granting each such exemption.
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